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1. Introduction 
A number of empirical studies argue that absenteeism is a serious problem in many countries. Barmby, 
Ercolani and Treble (2002) show that sickness absence rates range from 1.78 for Switzerland to 6.31 for 
Sweden. There is also empirical evidence that public sector workers are usually more prone to taking sick 
leaves compared with similar employees working in the private sector (Winkelmann, 1999; Banerjee, 
Duflo, 2006). 
 In Italy, as frequently lamented in the press (for example Corriere della Sera, Agu 24th 2006; Dec 
4th 2007; Sole24Ore, Mar 3rd 2008, Apr 16th 2007; The Economist, Agu 28th 2008), differences between 
private and public sector absenteeism are impressive: data from the Italian Economic Ministry 
(Ragioneria Generale dello Stato) show that in year 2006 the Italian public sector employees took 11 days 
off due to sick-leave, from 30% to 50% more than their private sector counterparts (according to a note of 
the public-administration minister Brunetta)1. 
 Public sector absenteeism produces direct and indirect costs: the public administration sustains the 
costs of wage payment to the absent workers and in many cases it has to pay the wage costs due to their 
substitutes (for example, in public schools, temporary contracts are used to hire teachers replacing absent 
workers); indirect costs also play an important role, especially in terms of adverse effects on the quality of 
services offered. In a recent speech, the leader of the Italian employers’ federation (Confindustria), 
Montezemolo, claimed that absenteeism in the Italian public sector costs the taxpayer the equivalent of 
one point of GDP. 
 In spite of the magnitude of the phenomenon, also due to the lack of suitable data, little economic 
research has been conducted to understand the determinants of absenteeism among public sector 
employees.  
  As suggested by previous studies, absenteeism can be related either to health factors or to 
shirking behaviour. Being able to disentangle these aspects and to distinguish between voluntary absence 
and involuntary absence is a crucial point to design adequate policy responses to absenteeism. In fact, the 
right to absence when sick is a central part of the 'contract' between employer and employee, and those 
who are off work, sick, have the right to expect sensitive treatment and support. On the other hand, since 
it is often very costly to ascertain individual health condition, people may be tempted to assume 
opportunistic behaviours taking days off also when they are not genuinely sick, imposing in this way 
                                                          
1 Self reported data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) point at a difference 
between absence rates in the private and public sector of 20%. According to other sources this difference is much 
higher, for example Giacalone (2008) argues that absenteeism is four times higher in the public sector than in private 
companies.  
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considerable costs on the organization employing them2. As a consequence, being able to identify drivers 
for absence frequency and to take the necessary actions would permit public administrations to save large 
amounts of money3. 
 However, it is generally difficult to disentangle absence due to shirking behaviour from genuinely 
sickness leaves. Recently, some authors (Ichino, Maggi, 2000; Bradley et al., 2007) have looked at the 
existence of peer effects on individual absences as an indicator of shirking behaviour. A positive 
relationship between individual absenteeism and peer group absenteeism would suggest that absence is 
more likely to be due to shirking rather than to sickness.  
 In this study we follow a similar approach in trying to understand whether shirking behaviour 
plays a relevant role in shaping absence rates of public sector employees. We use a unique dataset on a 
sample of 329 workers, which are employed at the Italian National Social Security Institute, INSSI, 
(Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale). More precisely our data concern 8 units of the INSSI 
located in a province of the South of Italy. We explain absence rates both considering variables that may 
be related to individual health conditions and to variables that may hide shirking behaviour. Among these 
variables we especially focus our attention on the influence produced by social interactions and group 
behaviour.  
 While many other works on this subject rely on measures of absence that are based upon self-
reported absence information, we have very accurate administrative data. This allows us to avoid 
problems related to misreporting4 and to provide a very reliable analysis on the determinants of 
absenteeism in the public sector, which is particularly relevant given the little statistical work available on 
the subject. 
 The first part of the paper is devoted at analysing the determinants of public sector workers’ 
absenteeism, focusing on personal and job characteristics. We show that a number of variables, which are 
typically not related to individual health condition, such as contractual form and agency size, are relevant 
in determining absence rates. This first evidence suggests that sickness absence is at least partially due to 
shirking behaviour.   
 In the second part of the paper, we investigate group interaction effects on absenteeism. More 
precisely, we analyse how the absence rate of employees is affected by the absenteeism behaviour of co-
                                                          
2 Psychological theories suggesting that absenteeism may enhance efficiency by providing workers in stressful 
situation with a temporary relief (Steers and Rhodes, 1978), do not seem relevant when absenteeism becomes such a 
diffuse phenomenon as in the Italian public sector. 
3 Renato Brunetta, the public-administration minister of the current Italian government, has recently (August 2008) 
imposed by decree a rule that, after the second absence in any year, only medical certificates issued by the public 
health service will be acceptable. In addition he has introduced productivity bonuses based in part on attendance 
records. Our data, concerning absences in 2007, do not allow to analyse the effect of this policy intervention. 
4 For example, Johns (1994) reports that employees tend to be absent more than twice as often as their self-reports 
indicate and individuals with higher actual absences tend to be more inaccurate in their self-reports than individuals 
with lower actual absence. 
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workers. We consider employees working in the same division as the relevant sphere of social interaction: 
on the one hand these workers are required to cooperate and communicate among them and by this way 
they contribute to the shaping of their working environment, on the other hand they interact on daily basis 
and tend to establish friendly relationships. Then, for each worker i we consider as members of his/her 
peer group all the workers employed in the same division and peer absence behaviour is calculated as the 
average of absence rates of individuals in the group.     
 As it is well known in the economic literature (Manski, 1993), empirical analyses trying to detect 
peer group effects face two main problems: one is related to the fact that individuals generally choose 
their peers (self-selection problem) and the choice can be related to unobservable individual factors; the 
other, known as reflection problem, emerges because members of the same group undertake 
interdependent behaviours, in our case the shirking behaviour of each member affects shirking of all other 
members, but at the same time it is influenced by how all other members behave. Different strategies have 
been adopted to overcome these problems: some works rely on situations in which peers are randomly 
assigned (for example Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmermann, 2003); other analyses use an instrumental variable 
approach trying to identify exogenous determinants of peer groups (Case and Katz, 1991; Gaviria and 
Raphael, 2001; Hanushek et al., 2003); some authors add group specific fixed effects (when more than 
one observation for group is available) to control for correlated unobservables. 
 Self selection problems are not a major concern in our analysis as our sample employees are not 
able to choose among different divisions or even among different units. In order to obtain a job at the 
Italian National Social Security Institute it is necessary to win a national competition. Once the job has 
been obtained the assignment to different units and within the same unit to different divisions is related to 
the particular needs of the Institute5. Employees during their career can change divisions due to career 
advancements, but also in this case the procedure is very formal and it is necessary to pass a competition 
for any place that becomes vacant. Only in very special cases workers can ask to change division, but the 
head of the personnel office explained us that this is very unusual and the few demands that were 
presented over time were all rejected.   
 To deal with reflection problems we use Two-Stage Least Squares estimation and instrument peer 
absences with the percentage of females in the division. We pointed at this particular predetermined 
feature of peer groups, since according to our analysis the gender variable has a strong impact on absence 
behaviour, while other personal characteristics play a minor role. This variable should not directly affect 
individual i absence rate, but may have a relevant impact on peer absenteeism. To be more concrete, we 
do not expect that working in a division characterized by a greater female presence directly affects the 
individual decision to be absent, but it may influence one’s propensity to be absent mainly through the 
increased probability that one’s peers are absent. 
                                                          
5 This information has been provided by the head of the personnel office. 
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 From our analysis it emerges that absenteeism is strongly influenced by peer group effects and 
that workplace absence norms produce a relevant effect on individual shirking. In our Instrumental 
Variable preferred specification, we find that an increase of one standard deviation in peer group absence 
rate produces an increase in individual i absence rate of 0.28 standard deviations (the OLS estimates show 
a smaller coefficient equal to 0.16). 
 As the higher absence rates observed in certain divisions may also be due to a contagion effect, 
we have tested the “social interaction assumption” analysing the effect produced by peer absences due to 
family-study leaves on individual sickness absences. From our analysis it emerges that individuals whose 
peers have higher absence rates due to family-study leaves tend to be more often absent due to sickness 
reasons, giving support to the idea that the higher absenteeism observed in certain divisions is likely to be 
due to social interaction effects rather than to contagion effects.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the related literature. In section three 
data are presented and some descriptive statistics are offered. In section four we estimate a simple OLS 
model to examine the effect of a number of personal and job characteristics on absenteeism. Section five 
investigates peer group effects and presents both OLS and 2SLS estimates. Section six concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
An increasing economic literature is devoting attention to absenteeism and many papers have analysed its 
determinants and costs. Browns and Sessions (1996) in their survey of the relevant theoretical and 
empirical research, discuss a large number of works, which highlight the influence of many variables on 
absenteeism.  
 Some of these variables are related to health factors (inabilities, gender, working conditions, etc), 
while others are related to incentives and contractual aspects (the availability of sickness benefits, 
employment protection, firm size, labour market conditions) or to job satisfaction and absence culture.  
 However, it is often difficult to distinguish among them, since some factors that may influence 
health conditions, may also be related to the employee shirking behaviour. For example, the gender effect 
may be due to biological differences between men and women, but it may also be related to differences in 
shirking propensity (see Ichino and Moretti, 2008). 
 Different strategies have been adopted in order to try to disentangle absences due to shirking 
behaviour. An early approach followed in the economic literature (Auditor General, 1997; Imants and van 
Zoelen, 1995) was based on the analysis of absence spell length: absence periods exceeding a given 
number of days were generally considered as involuntary and only shorter episodes were expected to be 
influenced by motivational and shirking variables. But criteria based on absence length are not free from 
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criticisms: as suggested by Driver and Watson (1989), they may produce unreliable predictions, since a 
long spell absence could be as voluntary as short spells and sequences of short absence spells may be due 
to recurring sickness instead of being related to shirking behaviour.  
 Other works, based on the principal-agent theory, have investigated the relationship between 
absenteeism and variables such as incentives, monitoring and firing costs, labour market conditions. From 
some of these works it emerges that employees have reduced rates of absenteeism when they experience a 
wage decrease upon absence, implying that shirking behaviour is influenced by the incentive structure. 
(Barmby et al. 1995,  Johansson and Palme, 1996; Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Hassing and Koning, 
2005). In addition, a number of empirical analyses shows that absence rates increase when monitoring 
costs increase. For example, Winkler (1979) and Winkelman (1999) show a negative relationship between 
firm size and absence rates, which can be explained in relation to the higher monitoring costs faced by 
larger firms. Other works have analysed the relationship between firing costs and absence behaviour 
(Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005; Arai and Thoursie, 2005). They find that 
temporary workers and workers on probation are less likely to be absent and show lower absence rates. 
These results can be interpreted considering that shirking is particularly costly for these workers, since 
they work under contractual arrangements characterized by less severe firing restrictions.  
 As far as labour market conditions are concerned, the empirical literature highlights that 
absenteeism is inversely related to the unemployment rate (Leigh, 1985). According to the standard 
efficiency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), this may depend on the fact that the threat of being 
fired, if the employee is discovered to shirk, is more effective when unemployment is high.6  
 Particularly relevant for this paper are some recent works examining peer group effects on 
individual shirking behaviour. Group interaction effects have been extensively studies in relation to 
educational outcomes and social phenomena, such as crime, alcohol, drug use, etc. (Case and Katz, 1991; 
Sacerdote, 2001; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Kremer, 2008). As regards shirking, these kind of effects 
can operate among co-workers via different mechanisms mainly based on monitoring and stigma 
channels: in fact, both peer monitoring and stigma are lower when shirking represents a diffuse and 
acceptable behaviour. Following this type of reasoning, Ichino and Maggi (2000), in a paper studying 
regional absenteeism differentials within a large Italian bank, show that peer group interaction effects play 
a relevant role in explaining these differentials. A similar result has been obtained by Bradley et al. (2007) 
analysing the impact of group interactions on the absence behaviour of primary and secondary school 
teachers.  
  
                                                          
6 However, it is worthwhile to say that the negative relationship between unemployment rate and absences may also 
depend on employers’ dismissal decisions. If employer can choose whom to lay-off, workers with higher absence 
rates will be those who are fired first in a recession, this results in a change in workforce composition over the 
business cycle (Arai and Thoursie, 2004). 
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3. Institutional framework, data and descriptive statistics 
Our analysis uses personnel data obtained from 8 units of the Italian National Social Security Institute 
(INSSI). These units are located in a Southern Italian province and employ 329 workers. Our data refer to 
year 2007 and offer detailed information on a number of personal characteristics (such us gender, number 
of sons, place of residence, education, age, number of hours contracted to work, tenure, wage etc.), on a 
number of work-place characteristics (such as place of work, unit-size, occupational codes, work division 
etc) and on different measures of absence (absence due to sickness, absence due to family-study leaves, 
time off due to the participation to union assemblies, leaves to blood donors and leaves to persons with 
disabilities or to individuals with family members who have a handicap). 
 We focus our attention mainly on absences due to sickness. However, we also provide some 
descriptive statistics considering the other measures of absenteeism we have at hand. 
 According to the National Collective Employment Contract of public sector workers (C.C.N.L) 
absences for sickness must be justified by a doctor’s certificate (within the first two day of sickness). The 
employer can ask for an additional “official medical check”, which has to be performed by doctors who 
are not chosen by workers, but autonomously appointed by subjects involved in monitoring sick absences. 
However, since health conditions are difficult to ascertain even for competent doctors, sickness absence 
may hide shirking behaviour. This also because employees are generally fully-insured against earning 
losses due to sickness, and as a consequence they may be induced to take days off and obtain their wage 
without providing any effort. This aspect is particularly relevant for the workers considered in this study, 
since Italian public sector employees, until August 2008, were entitled to full replacement of wage income 
(including all allowances or emoluments of a fixed, continuative nature” and “all other ancillary economic 
benefits”) for the first nine months of sickness7.  
     Our data-set does not provide information on absence spell length and for each type of absence, 
we only have information of the total number of hours the worker has been away from work during the 
year 2007. The measure of absence we use is the ratio of the number of hours absent to the number of 
hours contracted to work.  As in Barmby et al. (1999) and Barmby et al. (2002) we define the absence rate 
iR  as the ratio of the total number of hours of absence (due to sickness, to study-family leaves etc.), iA , 
                                                          
7 A note signed in June 2008 by the minister (approved by decree in August 2008), Renato Brunetta, to all branches 
of the public administration, points out that official medical checks “are always mandatory”. For each period of 
illness, the first days of absence will incur a reduction in pay, regardless of duration, although not all elements of 
salary will be affected. Cuts will apply to “all allowances or emoluments of a fixed, continuative nature” and “all 
other ancillary economic benefits”. In addition, productivity bonuses will be earned “only in proportion to work 
actually performed and the results achieved”.  
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recorded by the administrative office in year 2007, to the total number of contracted hours, iT , for the 
same year, then: iii TAR /= 8.  
 Table 1 reports absence rates considering different measures of absence based on different type of 
leaves. The average absence rate due to sickness is of about 5%, corresponding to an average of about 12 
days of sick leave. The absence rates due to family-study leaves and related to handicaps are also quite 
high, respectively 2.7% and 2%, while the absence rates due to other causes are negligible. The total 
absence rate is on average of 10.5%, which corresponds to 25 days off work during the year.  
 These descriptive statistics show the existence of a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the 
absenteeism behaviour of workers. On average, 22% of them are never absent due to sickness reasons, 
while at the opposite end of the distribution, 10% of our sample employees accumulate more than 22 days 
of absence over the year. Sharper differences emerge when we consider absences due to family-study 
reasons: 32% of workers never take this type of leave, while workers in the top 10% of the distribution 
show about 50 days of absence. When we look at the total absence rate it emerges that only about 8% of 
workers are never absent, workers in the lower 50% of the distribution show on average a total absence 
rate of 2%, while those in the upper 50% of the distribution present an average total absence rate of 18%. 
 
Table 1. Absence rates 
Absence Rate  Mean Std. Dev.           Min Max 
Leaves due to illness   0.050   0.067    0   0.383 
Family and study Leaves  0.027               0.094   0 0.849 
Leaves due to union activities  0.003     0.014   0   0.175 
Leaves to blood donors  0.0003           0.002     0 0.016 
Leaves related to handicaps  0.020             0.045   0   0.266 
Total leaves  0.101              0.124 0   0.853 
  
 In Table 2 we report some descriptive statistics on the employees subject to this study. They are 
on average in their fifties, about 50% of them are female and 36% have obtained a university degree. 81% 
of workers have at least one son, while the average number of sons is of 1.58. Unfortunately we do not 
have information on the age of sons.  
  
Table 2. Summary Statistics  
 Mean Std. Dev.     Min Max Observations 
Female 0.523           0.500 0    1 329 
University Degree 0.362           0.481 0       1 329 
Number of sons 1.583           0.944 0   4 329 
                                                          
8 However, since 95% of the employees have the same number of contracted hours, this measure is not very different 
from that based on the total number of  absence hours.  
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Age 49.607         7.091  29      66 329 
Age^2 2513.97       696.296  841 4356 329 
Dummy for workers travelling to work  0.526 0.500 0 1 329 
Km distance from workplace 28.613         116.266   0    1071 329 
Dummy for residence in a different province 0.030     0.171 0          1 329 
Tenure  20.263 10.622         0     39 329 
Yearly Gross Wage  38448          15283  7281    182081 329 
Dummy for employees hired in year 2007  0.030           0.171 0          1 329 
Dummy for division manager  0.078           0.269 0          1 329 
Unit size 184.055       100.948 4     243 329 
Division size 14.214         4.781 1          22 329 
Divisions sharing the same supervisor 0.229 0.421 0 1 329 
Blood donors  0.042           0.202 0        1 329 
Union 0.305           0.461 0          1 329 
Handicap 0.193  0.395 0 1 329 
Peer-absence rate due to sickness 0.053          0.028   0    0.135 329 
  
 About 47% of workers live in the same town in which the unit employing them is located; on 
average the distance from the place of residence to the workplace is of 28 kilometres. The 3% of the 
sample workers have been hired in 2007 and, according to National Collective Employment Contract of 
public sector employees, for the first six months after hiring were on probation9. It is worthwhile to notice 
that during this period the employer is allowed to dismiss the worker without reason or warning. 
 As far as occupational variables are concerned, the workers we consider are mainly employed in 
administrative jobs, which can be classified along three main levels: at the lower occupational level is 
employed the 13% of the workers, 75% of workers have a job classified at the intermediate level, while 
12% of them have a top level job. The average tenure is of 20 years and the average yearly gross wage is 
of about 38,400 euros. 
 73% of the sample workers are employed in a large unit (employing 243 workers), while the 
remaining work in small units with an average size of 15 workers. Within the same unit workers are 
organized along different divisions. The average size of a division is of 13 employees. Each division 
generally deals with a particular type of activity, for example family support, income support, self-
employed pensions etc. Tasks managed by employees of different divisions are quite similar.10 We 
consider as peers of employee i all the workers employed in the same division in which individual i is 
employed. The peer average absence rate is of 5.3%, ranging from 0 to 13.5%. 
 Using data from leaves due to union activity participation and blood donations we have defined 
two dummy variables, Union and Blood_donors, taking value one when workers have obtained leaves 
                                                          
9 The Italian legislator set an upper limit to the length of probationary periods at the beginning of a labour contract of 
six  months. This is also the length of probation established for public sector employees. 
10 The smaller units are not always organized along divisions and in these cases the unit is treated as a 
division. 
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motivated respectively by union activity participation and by blood donations. Similarly, we infer 
information on personal or family disabilities from the information we have on leaves due to these reasons 
and define a dummy Handicap taking value one when the worker has obtained this kind of leave. It 
emerges that 19% of workers have obtained leaves in relation to personal or family disabilities, while 30% 
of them have participated to some union activity and 4% of them are blood donors.  
 As far as peers are concerned we choose divisions as the relevant sphere of interaction. As a 
consequence, we consider  
 
 
 
3. The Effect of Personal and Job Characteristics on Absence Rates 
 
In this section we analyse the effect of personal and job characteristics on public sector absenteeism, 
focusing on absences due to sickness. The dependent variable, iF , is formulated in two ways: as the ratio 
iii TAR /=  and as a log-odds ratio [ ])1/(ln ii RR − , since the distribution of iR  is not normal, being 
restricted between 0 and 1 and with a mass on 011. We then estimate by OLS the following simple model: 
 
[1]  εα +++= kiii DJPF  
 
where iP  is a vector of individual characteristics, iJ  is a vector of job characteristics and kD  is a dummy 
variable to capture unobserved unit effects, with 8....1=k .  
 Table 3 reports estimates of Eq. (1). In all specifications, standard errors (reported in parentheses) 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Since the treatment is occurring at the division level, we cluster 
standard errors at this level to correct for serial correlation within divisions across time. All variables have 
been standardized to render the interpretation of marginal effects more straightforward. 
 The main personal characteristics we consider are: sex, age, education, number of sons, a dummy 
for employees travelling to work12 and a dummy for those whose residence is different from the province 
in which the units providing data are located. Among the job features, we observe: tenure, yearly gross 
wages, unit size and a dummy variable for workers who in 2007 were under probation.  
 In columns (1) and (2) are reported OLS estimates, including unit fixed effects, when we consider 
as dependent variable respectively the absence rate due to sickness iR  and [ ])1/(ln ii RR − . 
                                                          
11 We have used the approximation [ ] 8.5)01/(0ln −=−  to account for the indeterminacy of the extreme of the 
distribution.  
12 In an alternative specification we control for the distance to workplace, but results remain substantially 
unchanged. 
 10
 The dummy female is positive and statistically significant in both specifications (respectively at 
5% and at 1% level in the two specifications) implying that female employees are more absent from work. 
This result can be related either to the gender division of household work, to a weaker attachment to work 
of females (Viscusi, 1980; Leigh, 1983) or to biological differences between males and females (Ichino 
and Moretti, 2008).13 
 Age produces a positive effect on absenteeism due to sickness, which may be due to the fact older 
individuals tend to have worst health conditions or to be less attached to their job. As it is possible to see 
in columns (1) and (2) the effect is statistically significant (at 10% level) only when we measure our 
dependent variable with the absence rate iR . We have also considered the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between age and absenteeism by including an age squared term in our regressions. The 
quadratic term shows the expected negative sign, but it is statistically significant only in the first 
specification (at 10% level). 
 The number of sons has a negative but not statistically significant effect. The negative coefficient 
shown by this variable can be due to the fact that in the Italian public sector, employees can use special 
leaves for family needs.14 Employees with a university degree have a lower propensity to be absent due to 
sickness reasons, however, the effect is not statistically significant in both specifications15.  
 
Table 3. The effects of personal and job characteristics on absence rates. OLS estimates   
 iii TAR /=  [ ])1/(ln ii RR − iii TAR /=  [ ])1/(ln ii RR −
Female 0.299**   
(0.126)
0.486*** 
(0.109)
0.258**   
(0.126)
0.446*** 
(0.106) 
University Degree -0.206 
(0.124)
-0.149 
(0.109)
-0.213 
(0.122)
-0.164 
(0.109) 
Number of sons -0.001    
(0.027)
-0.026   
(0.037)
-0.004    
(0.028)
-0.035  
(0.035) 
Age 0.659* 
(0.334)
0.674 
(0.404)
0.631* 
(0.314)
0.601 
(0.387) 
Age^2 -0.645*  
(0.379)
-0.646  
(0.432)
-0.631*   
(0.356)
-0.576 
(0.411) 
Dummy for employees travelling to 
work 
0.102    
(0.125)
0.137  
(0.107)
0.102    
(0.126)
0.148  
(0.111) 
Dummy_different_ province -0.167 
(0.207)
-0.160 
(0.367)
-0.125 
(0.201)
-0.127 
(0.371) 
Tenure 0.069    
(0.098)
0.036   
(0.096)
0.088    
(0.099)
0.075   
(0.090) 
                                                          
13 However, since the female dummy is positive and statistically significant also when we consider measures of 
absences that are not related to health conditions, for example absence due to family or study leaves, the higher 
absenteeism of females cannot be exclusively related to biological aspects.  
14 In fact, when we consider the total absence rate or the absence rate due to family and study leaves it emerges that 
employee with sons have a higher rate of absence. 
15 The negative impact of an higher level of education on absenteeism may be related to the fact that better educated 
individuals tend to devote more attention to health problems and to prevention schemes or it may be due to 
motivational issues, since more educated people generally perform better jobs, which are usually associated with a 
higher degree of job satisfaction. 
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Yearly Gross Wage -0.114* 
(0.065)
-0.138** 
(0.025)
-0.106* 
(0.061)
-0.114** 
(0.048) 
Probation -0.653*** 
(0.200)
-1.802*** 
(0.190)
-0.596*** 
(0.188)
-0.958*** 
(0.192) 
Unit size 0.292*** 
(0.049)
0.327*** 
(0.065)
0.280*** 
(0.049)
0.314*** 
(0.067) 
Handicap   0.261* 
(0.041)
0.380*** 
(0.125) 
Union    -0.021 
(0.119)
0.160 
(0.127) 
Blood donors   -0.256 
(0.177)
-0.084 
(0.248) 
Constant -0.215* -0.397** -0.219* -0.500*** 
Observations 329 329 329 329 
R-squared 0.103 0.150 0.115 0.174 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) and incorporating clustering grouped by division are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
  
 Nor the dummy variable for individuals travelling to the workplace neither that for being resident 
outside the province in which the units we consider are located show a statistically significant effect. 
 As far as job characteristics are concerned, from our estimates it emerges a negative relationship 
between yearly gross wage and absenteeism, which is statistically significant in both specifications 
(respectively at 10% and 5% level). An increase of one standard deviation in yearly gross wages produces 
a reduction of the absence rate going form 0.11 to 0.14 standard deviations, according to the specification. 
Similar results are been found by Drago and Wooden (1992) and Chaudhury and Ng (1992), while Leigh 
(1991) finds no impact of wages and paid sick leave on individual absenteeism.16 On the other hand, once 
we control for wages and age, tenure does not produce any statistically significant effect. 
 In addition, it emerges that the size of the unit is relevant for employees absence behaviour and an 
increase in the unit size produces an increase in the rate of absence. The effect is statistically significant in 
both specifications at 1% level. This corroborates previously reported findings. For example Winkelmann 
(1999) finds that workers in large firms (with 201 to 2000 employees) have 1.8 more absence days than 
workers in smaller firms (with 21 to 200 employees). 
 Finally, from our analysis it emerges that employees who in year 2007 where on probation take 
significantly fewer days of absences than their colleagues (the effect is statistically significant in both 
specifications at 1% level). This is in line with findings obtained by works investigating the relationship 
between employment protection legislation and workers’ shirking behaviour. For example, Ichino and 
Riphahan (2005), analysing the behaviour of the employees of a large Italian bank during and after 
probation find that absenteeism is significantly lower during the probationary period.  
                                                          
16 We have also experimented including among regressors a dummy variable for employees who are division 
manager. The effect is negative but statistically insignificant, while no other substantial effects emerge. 
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 In column (4) and (5) we have included among regressors the dummy variables Handicap, Union 
and Blood_donors. As expected, it emerges that absence is higher among persons with disabilities or 
individuals with family members who have a handicap (the effects is statistically significant at 10% and 
1% level according to the specification). Being a blood donor produces a negative but statistical 
insignificant effect on absence rates. Finally, being involved in union activities produces an ambiguous 
effect since the sign of the dummy variable Union changes from negative to positive according to the 
measure of absence adopted (it is never statistically significant).  
 The pseudo R2  measures are low in all specifications, but they are comparable with those found 
in other studies (eg., Allen, 1981, and Barmby and Treble, 1991). Overall, the estimates are generally well 
defined and of the expected sign.  
 
 
 
 
4. Peer effects on absence behaviour  
In this section we examine the effects produced by group interactions on individual absence behaviour. 
We firstly describe our econometric methodology and then we present both OLS and 2SLS estimates.  
 
4.1. Empirical Methodology 
Our analysis is now devoted at establishing whether the individual absence rate is affected by the absence 
behaviour of his peers. The definition of the relevant sphere of interaction poses a number of problems, 
since it is not clear whether individuals are mainly influence by their friends, by people from their place of 
residence, or by co-workers. Our definition of peer group is based on workers employed in the same 
division. We think that subjects working together, interacting on daily basis, tend to establish friendly 
relationships and as a consequence the division in which the employee works may represent the relevant 
sphere of interaction.  
 Our empirical specification follows Case and Katz (1991) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001). We 
extend the simple model represented by equation [1] as follows:  
 
[2]  εα ++++= iKiii ADJPF  
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 where iA  is the average incidence of absenteeism among co-workers of individual i. More 
precisely peer absence behaviour is calculated as the average of absence rates of workers employed in the 
same division employing worker i: ∑=
=
dN
n
n
d
i F
N
A
1
1  where nF  measures absences of individual n working 
in division d with subject i and  dN  is the number of peers in the division d.  
 According to the specification proposed in equation [2], the absence behaviour of individual   is 
influenced by the behaviour of his/her peers, but it is not directly affected by the average predetermined 
characteristics of his/her peer group, iP , which are assumed to affect his/her absences only indirectly 
through peer interactions. 
 The estimation of equation [2] poses a number of econometrics problems. First, we have to deal 
with the so-called reflection problem, in fact on the one hand the average behaviour of peers influences 
individual behaviour, but on the other hand individual absence behaviour also affects group absenteeism. 
Second, employees may sort according to some personal unobservable characteristics in different 
divisions generating relevant endogeneity problems. Third common shocks or correlated effects may 
influence individuals belonging to the some group. For example, in our case, certain divisions may 
involve more unpleasant tasks.  
 We are confident that the second bias is not relevant for our estimates since, as explained in detail 
in section one, the assignment of workers to divisions depends exclusively on the needs of the INSSI. 
Individuals are assigned to a division instead than to another at the beginning of their career in relation to 
the opening of a vacancy in that particular division, due for example to the retirement decisions of older 
workers, etc. Employees are not able to choose and the assignment is random conditional on the fact that 
the employee meets some formal requirements, generally in terms of level and type of education 
acquired17.  During their career employees can move from a division to another only in very special cases, 
defined by a law18. According to the head of the personnel office these cases are extremely rare. 
 The correction for the second source of bias is based on the assumption that contextual effects are 
not relevant and, as a consequence, there is no direct relationship between subject i’s absence behaviour 
and the average pre-determined characteristics of his/her co-workers, iP . These variables should not 
produce a direct influence on the absence behaviour of individual i, but may have a relevant impact on 
peer absenteeism. In fact individuals working in a division characterized by a greater female presence or 
by a larger proportion of graduate colleagues should not be directly influenced by these aspects in their 
absence decisions, while they may result indirectly affected since these pre-determined peer group 
characteristics tend to influence peer group absences. 
                                                          
17 The Italian law offers a high level of protection in terms of equal opportunities among different types of workers. 
18 “Regolamento organico del personale”, November-1990.  
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 We have experimented using different set of average pre-determined peer characteristics, however 
only the proportion of females in the division turns out to be relevant in explaining peer average absence 
behaviour. Then, we have instrumented peer absence behaviour with the proportion of females in the 
division. We think that, since contextual effects should not be relevant in our case, this instrument, f, 
comply with the usual conditions: the instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable, 
( ) 0,__ ≠frateabsencePeerCov  and it does not affect directly individual i absence behaviour 
( ) 0, =εfCov .  
 The use of the proportion of females as an instrument also helps at avoiding problems deriving 
from common shock bias.  
 In the next section we present both OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation [2]. 
 
 
4.2. OLS and 2SLS Estimation Results 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of alternative specifications of our model considering as dependent 
variable iii TAR /=  and [ ])1/(ln ii RR − .  
 In estimates shown in columns (1) and (2) we have not included among our controls the three 
dummy variables Handicap, Union, Blood_donor. It emerges that, controlling for personal and job 
characteristics, peer effects appear positive and significant. An increase in the absence rate of the peer 
group of individual i leads to an increase in his absenteeism. As shown in column (1) an increase in peer 
absence rate of one standard deviation leads to an increase in individual absence rate of 0.16 standard 
deviations. The coefficient is significant at 5% level. A positive and statistically significant effect (at 5% 
level) emerges also when we measure the dependent variable using [ ])1/(ln ii RR − . No relevant changes 
are observed when we include among regressors additional controls for union participation, blood 
donations and handicaps (columns 3 and 4).19 
  
  Table 4. OLS regressions relating individual absenteeism to peer group behaviour  
 iii TAR /=  [ ])1/(ln ii RR − iii TAR /=  [ ])1/(ln ii RR −
Peer absence rate 0.161** 
(0.069)
0.192** 
(0.087)
0.157** 
(0.069)
0.176** 
(0.086) 
Female 0.287**   
(0.127)
0.466*** 
(0.105)
0.245**   
(0.109)
0.437*** 
(0.104) 
University Degree -0.225*  
(0.121)
-0.164 
(0.107)
-0.228*  
(0.118)
-0.174 
(0.106) 
Number of sons 0.009    
(0.022)
-0.021 
(0.036)
0.005    
(0.022)
-0.029 
(0.034) 
Age 0.527*    
(0.267)
0.512 
(0.408)
0.513**    
(0.247)
0.465 
(0.392) 
                                                          
19 The other explanatory variables have approximately the same level of significance as in Table 3. 
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Age^2 -0.519  
(0.328)
-0.481 
(0.446)
-0.519*  
(0.305)
-0.438 
(0.425) 
Dummy for employees travelling to 
work 
0.084 
(0.129)
0.121 
(0.111)
0.085 
(0.130)
0.134 
(0.114) 
Dummy_different_ province -.154  
(0.224)
-0.134   
(0.391)
-0.106  
(0.214)
-0.096   
(0.394) 
Tenure 0.076  
(0.096)
-0.046 
(0.087)
0.090  
(0.099)
-0.078 
(0.085) 
Yearly Gross Wage -0.104* 
(0.061)
-0.123**   
(0.050)
-0.100* 
(0.058)
-0.104**   
(0.043) 
Probation -0.532*** 
(0.178)
-0.923*** 
(0.233)
-0.498*** 
(0.179)
-0.838*** 
(0.253) 
Unit size 0.186*** 
(0.069)
0.194**    
(0.087)
0.174** 
(0.072)
0.191**    
(0.089) 
Handicap   0.239* 
(0.139)
0.354*** 
(0.117) 
Union   -0.065 
(0.117)
0.111 
(0.116) 
Blood donors   0.229 
(0.178)
-0.058 
(0.255) 
Constant -0.166 -0.321*** -0.153 -0.411*** 
Observations 329 329 329 329
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28
R-squared 0.123 0.179 0.134 0.199 
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) and incorporating clustering grouped by division are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
 However, coefficients deriving from OLS estimates are subject to the reflection problem and 
cannot be interpreted as casual. On the other hand, they show the degree of correlation in peer absence 
behaviour. 
 Table 5 displays 2SLS estimates using as instrument the proportion of females in the division in 
which individual i is employed. In estimates presented in this Table we have excluded among our controls 
the dummy variables Handicap, Union and Blood_donors, but results are not influenced by this choice.  
 The effects of personal and job characteristics are for the most part very similar to the OLS 
estimates. The 2SLS estimates of peer effects are higher compared to OLS estimates, suggesting that 
simultaneity problems produce a downward bias on the estimates of peer influence (similar results are 
obtained by Gaviria and Raphael, 2001). For example, when we measure absence behaviour using the 
absence rate iR , from 2SLS estimates we find that an increase of one standard deviation in peer group 
absence rate produces an increase in individual i absence rate of 0.29 standard deviations, while the OLS 
estimates pointed to a smaller effect, of about 0.16.  
 In columns (3) and (4) are reported estimates on a smaller sample including only workers 
employed at the larger unit. As already explained workers are not able to select among different units, 
however, if any selection is possible we think that it could be at unit level, since workers may try to get a 
job in a unit that is located near to their place of residence. To avoid problems that may derive from this 
type of selection, we focus only on the main unit employing the majority of our sample workers. In 
columns (3) and (4) are shown estimates for this sub-sample, using as dependent variable respectively iR  
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and [ ])1/(ln ii RR − . The main results remain substantially unchanged, the peer effect is only slightly 
higher in the first specification and slightly smaller in the second compared to estimates referring to the 
full sample.  
 Finally, since in divisions in which workers are often sick the influence of peer absenteeism on 
individual absence behaviour may also be due to a contagion effect, in column (5) are reported estimates 
of the effect produced by the peer absences due family-study reasons on the sickness absence rate of 
individual i. Our measure of peer absence behaviour is now represented by the proportion of peers taking 
family-study leaves. As shown in column 5, where the dependent variable is [ ])1/(ln ii RR − , it emerges 
that individuals whose peers are more likely to be off of work due to family-study leaves tend to be more 
often absent due to sickness reasons. The same holds true when we measure absences through iR  
(estimates are not reported to avoid clattering the Table). 
 F-statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 5, for the test of whether the instrument coefficient is 
equal to zero are always well above the threshold value of 10 suggested by Stock and Watson (2003). 
  
 
 
Table 5. 2SLS regressions relating individual absenteeism to peer group behaviour 
 
Panel A: Two Stage Least Squares 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 iii TAR =  [ ])1/(ln ii RR − iii TAR =  [ ])1/(ln ii RR −  [ )1/(ln ii RR −
Peer absence rate 0.286** 
(0.136) 
0.320*** 
(0.098) 
0.296** 
(0.133) 
0.310*** 
(0.095) 
0.314 ** 
(0.142) 
Female 0.278**  
(0.130) 
0.452*** 
(0.107) 
0.288*  
(0.167) 
0.523***   
(0.131) 
0.092*** 
(0.105) 
University Degree -0.240* 
(0.123) 
-0.174 
(0.106) 
-0.362** 
(0.161) 
-0.290** 
(0.134) 
-0.184 
(0.110) 
Number of sons -0.016    
(0.020) 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
-0.033    
(0.026) 
0.019    
(0.039) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
Age 0.425   
(0.310) 
0.402 
(0.452) 
0.728   
(0.458) 
0.392   
(0.505) 
0.309   
(0.469) 
Age^2 -0.422  
(0.372) 
-0.371 
(0.490) 
-0.648  
(0.508) 
-0.311  
(0.534) 
-0.288 
(0.497) 
Dummy for employees travelling to work 0.070    
(0.133) 
0.111 
(0.117) 
0.070    
(0.133) 
0.150    
(0.142) 
0.132 
(0.110) 
Dummy_different_ province -0.027 
(0.031) 
-0.117  
(0.410) 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
-0.400 
(0.644) 
-0.162 
(0.387) 
Tenure 0.082   
(0.096) 
0.053 
(0.085) 
0.082   
(0.096) 
0.022  
(0.124) 
0.048    
(0.083) 
Yearly Gross Wage -0.097    
(0.065) 
-0.114** 
(0.052) 
-0.089    
(0.059) 
-0.114**   
(0.041) 
-0.125**   
(0.047) 
Probation -0.438** 
(0.206) 
-0.817** 
(0.301) 
-0.528* 
(0.221) 
-0.752** 
(0.026) 
-0.685* 
(0.381) 
Unit size 0.103 
(0.193) 
0.105   
(0.087) 
  0.205**   
(0.090) 
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Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
 
 Peer absence 
rate 
Peer absence 
rate 
Peer absence 
rate 
Peer absence 
rate 
Peer absence 
rate 
Proportion of females in the  peer group 0.063*** 3.074*** 1.982*** 3.182*** 3.133*** 
Female 0.128  0.191 0.115 .182 0.070 
University Degree 0.085 0.022 0.090 -.026 0.056 
Number of sons -0.056 -0.028 0-.059 -.034 -0.092 
Age 0.417 0.207 0.705 .231 0.509 
Age^2 -0.361 -0.190 -0.586 -.165 -0.461 
Dummy for employees travelling to work 0.127 0.104 0.147 .124 0.037 
Dummy_different_ province -0.075 -0.122 -0.362  -.584 -0.017 
Tenure -0.075 -0.097 -0.151 -.197 -0.083 
Yearly Gross Wage -0.019 -0.010 -0.018 -.001 0.025 
Probation -0.797** -0.899*** -1.503*** -1.735*** -1.335*** 
Unit size 0.639*** 0.660***   0.355** 
      
Observations  329 329 243 243 329 
R-Squared 0.111 0.166 0.142 0.188  
F-statistics 25.22 46.85 24.26 47.83 40.90 
      
Notes: Panel A reports the Two-Stage Least Squares estimates, instrumenting . Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels.  
 
  
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have analysed the absence behaviour of public sector employees using a unique dataset 
on a sample of 329 workers, which are employed at the Italian National Social Security Institute, INSSI, 
(Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale). The availability of accurate administrative data allows us to 
avoid problems related to misreporting and to provide a very reliable picture of the determinants of 
absenteeism in the public sector, which is particularly relevant given the little statistical work available on 
the subject. 
 From our analysis it emerges that absenteeism is a function of personal and job characteristics 
such as gender, yearly gross wages, contractual arrangements and unit-size. Females and individuals 
obtaining lower wages show higher absence rates, while subjects under probation and working in smaller 
units tend to be less absent. While some of these variables may be related to individual health conditions 
and then suggest that absences occur for valid reasons, others, such as unit-size and contractual 
arrangement, may hide employee shirking behaviour.  
 To better investigate the relationship between sickness absences and shirking we have looked at 
the existence of peer effects on individual absences. A positive relationship between individual 
absenteeism and peer group absenteeism suggests that absence is more likely to be due to shirking rather 
than to sickness.    
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 We have considered division as the relevant sphere of social interactions, since individuals who 
work in the same place and have daily interactions are more likely to influence each other. Thanks to the 
fact that employees were assigned to different divisions and units exclusively in relation to the institute 
needs and individuals were not in the condition to choose, we have not to deal with self selection 
problems. On the other hand, we deal with reflection problems using as instrument of peer absence 
behaviour the proportion of females in the division. This variable should not directly affect the individual 
i’s absence decisions, but may influence it through group interaction effects.  
 Our analysis suggest that peer group effects play a crucial role in determining individual absence 
rate. From OLS estimates it emerges that an increase of one standard deviation in peer group absence rate 
produces an increase in individual i absence rate ranging from 0.16 to 0.19 standard deviations, according 
to the specification adopted. 2SLS estimatespoint to higher effects, suggesting that simultaneity problems 
produce a downward bias on the estimates of peer influence. 
 These results are in line with those emerging from the previous literature on the subject, showing 
that individual absence behaviour is related to the absenteeism of co-workers (Ichino, Maggi, 2000; 
Bradley et al., 2007). In addition, we show that the influence of peer absenteeism on individual absence 
behaviour is not due to contagion effects. In fact, we find relevant peer effects on sickness absences also 
when we measure peer absenteeism behaviour considering absences due to family-study reasons.  
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